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Abstract
This paper considers a two-stage game, where in the ﬁrst stage, two ﬁrms bid non-
cooperatively for a production technique that leads to a reduction in cost. Following the
auction in the second stage of the game these ﬁrms compete against each other in a duopolistic
industry. The amount of cost reduction for every ﬁrm following the adoption of the production
technique is a private information to the concerned ﬁrm. In the model, the auctioneer is the
government. Before the auction, the government announces whether she will reveal the bids
after the auction, which is her choice variable. This paper makes an attempt to ﬁgure out
the welfare implications of the bid disclosure policies under diﬀerent parametric and market
conditions. Our ﬁndings suggest that for the Bertrand competition in the second stage the
revelation of the bids does not have any impact on the level of social welfare. For the Cournot
competition in the second stage, whether the disclosure of bids would lead to higher level of
social welfare than when the bids are suppressed, is determined by parametric conditions.
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1 Introduction
The sale of licenses in order to allow certain ﬁrms in an industry to use any particular production
technique is a common phenomenon. The analysis of licensing of a particular technique is also
quite common in economics literature. Kamien, Oren and Tauman (1992) discuss the licensing of
a cost reducing innovation to an oligopolistic industry. They compare auctioning of a ﬁxed number
of licenses to a ﬁxed license fee and to a per unit royalty in terms of the patentee's proﬁt, licensees'
proﬁts, industry structure and product price. Their results suggest that auctioning licenses is the
optimal strategy when the magnitude of innovation is not too small (although it does not hold for
an arbitrary innovation). Cramton and Kerr (2002) suggest that an auction of carbon permits is
the best way to achieve carbon caps set by international negotiation to limit global climate change.
With this backdrop we can think of a situation where there is an oligopolistic industry, in which
the ﬁrms can use some production technique and only a limited number of licenses for using this
technique are available. Therefore, only a limited number of ﬁrms can be permitted to use such
a technique. If we consider the government to have the objective of maximizing social welfare
and to be the authority that can sell these licenses, then the concerned licenses can actually be
allocated through auction, with the government being the auctioneer. For example we can consider
the auction of spectrum licenses in the United Kingdom. In the year 2000, the UK Government
conducted an auction selling ﬁve licenses for diﬀerent frequencies. There had been a larger number
of bidders than the number of available licenses. Another example where the government sells a
resource which is limited in amount through auction is that of land auction.
In this paper we look at a situation where the government is selling a limited number of licenses for
a cost reducing production technique (due to its limited availability). We consider a two-stage game
where, in the ﬁrst stage, two ﬁrms bid non-cooperatively for the production technique that leads
to a reduction in cost and the government oﬀers to sell a single license for this technique through
auction. Following the auction, in the second stage of the game, these ﬁrms compete against
each other in an oligopolistic industry. The amount of cost reduction for every ﬁrm following the
adoption of the cost reducing production technique is a private information to the concerned ﬁrm.
Based on this private information, each ﬁrm submits a bid in the ﬁrst stage auction. Therefore,
the amount of cost reduction for each ﬁrm subject to the adoption of the technique constitutes
its type. We consider a symmetric framework where the types are independently and identically
distributed over the same interval and involving the same distribution and density functions. Here,
the government is the auctioneer and its objective is to maximise social welfare.1 Before the auction
the government decides and announces whether to disclose or suppress the bids. This paper makes
an attempt to ﬁgure out the welfare implications of the bid disclosure policies under diﬀerent
1The Social welfare function has been explicitly speciﬁed in the subsequent analysis.
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parametric conditions, when the oligopolistic competition in the second stage of the game is ﬁrst
of a Cournot type and then of a Bertrand type.
Many analysis of similar two-stage games are available in the existing literature. We discuss some
of them, which are somewhat close to our work, here. Goeree (2003) considers a mature market in
which competitors know one another's costs. The prevalent mode changes with the auction of a
cost reducing innovation (which is protected by a patent) where the winner is granted the license
to use the innovation. The competition in the second stage of the game is ﬁrst of a Cournot type
and then of a Bertrand type. The results of this paper capture the impact of the prevailing mode
of competition in the aftermarket on the bidding behaviour in ﬁrst and second price as well as
English auctions. Two major ﬁndings of this paper are that ﬁrst, the strategic equivalence between
the English and the second price auctions breaks down and second, the revenue equivalence breaks
down due to signaling eﬀects.
Das Varma (2003) also analyzes a similar two-stage game and examines whether a ﬁrst-price
sealed-bid auction is eﬃcient in allocating a process innovation amongst oligopolists engaged in
either Cournot or Bertrand competition. The results he has derived ensure the existence of a
unique equilibrium in strictly increasing strategies which is symmetric, and therefore allocatively
eﬃcient for the Cournot type competition but not for a Bertrand type competition in the in the
downstream oligopolistic market. When the downstream market becomes perfectly competitive,
the eﬃciency in allocation is restored. Thus the results in this paper capture the sensitivity of
eﬃcient auction design to downstream market structures.
Molnar and Virag (2008) also consider a two-stage game that studies the eﬀect of post-auction
market interaction and asymmetric information on the design of a revenue maximizing mechanism.
Here the bidders can have incentives to signal their types to inﬂuence the outcome of the post-
auction market game. The results show that revealing all information about the winner is revenue-
maximizing if the post-auction competition is Cournot and revealing no information about the
winner is revenue-maximizing if the post-auction competition is Bertrand. Their paper also shows
that if bidders have additively separable utility functions in their true and signaled types, then
revealing information is revenue maximizing if the utility function is convex in the signaled type,
while hiding information is revenue maximizing if the utility function is concave.
Katzman and Rhodes-Kroph (2008) discuss a two-stage game where the ﬁrst stage involves an
auction of right to enter production in a market with an existing monopolist and in the second
stage, the winner of the ﬁrst stage auction competes with the existing so far monopolist ﬁrm. So,
in the ﬁrst stage, they consider a set of ﬁrms who are competing against each other. The marginal
cost of each ﬁrm is a private information and constitutes its type. Based on its type every ﬁrm
submits a bid in the auction. The bids are decreasing functions of types. The types are assumed to
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be distributed over the same interval following the same distribution function for all participating
ﬁrms. In this context after the ﬁrst stage the auctioneer can choose to announce the bids com-
pletely, partially or not at all. The results suggest that depending on whether post auction proﬁts
bear a positive or inverse relation to rival beliefs, the ﬁrms either bid more aggressively or signal
poorer types. So when post auction proﬁts are negatively related to rival beliefs, announcement
of bids leads to higher expected revenue to the auctioneer. For the opposite case, suppression of
bids leads to higher expected revenue. Their model, however, didn't make any general statement
regarding the welfare eﬀects brought about by diﬀerent announcement policies.
Scarpatetti and Wasser (2009) present a model involving a two-stage game where in the ﬁrst stage,
there is a multi-unit auction of a cost reducing technological innovation and in the following stage
this innovation is used by ﬁrms in an oligopolistic market structure where each ﬁrm has a private
information about its cost structure. The number of units of the cost reducing innovation is less
than the number of competing ﬁrms. After the ﬁrst stage auction, only the winning bids or all
the bids can be revealed publicly which creates an opportunity for signaling. The existence of
a truthful equilibrium in the auction, in which the bids truly represent the costs, depends on
the type and aggressiveness of competition in the second stage, the chosen auction format and
the policy regarding bid announcement. Their results suggest that, the existence of a separating
equilibrium, however, depends on several factors, including the type of auction format chosen.
The announcement of all bids for a discriminatory or a uniform-price auction poses the problem of
non-credible signals becoming more grave, so that existence of separating equilibria is possible in
the special case where the auction has only one loser . The existence of a separating equilibrium
becomes uncertain when there is Bertrand competition in the second stage. The weight of the
signaling incentive gets reduced with the revelation of less information which makes the existence
of a separating equilibrium under Bertrand competition possible. A separating equilibrium is
likely to exist when there is only one winner in the discriminatory auction (i.e., if it is a ﬁrst-price
auction) and if only this winning bid is disclosed. The same result holds for all uniform-price
auctions where only the highest losing bid is announced.
Our paper also concerns a two-stage game involving the auction of a cost-reducing technological
innovation in the ﬁrst stage and a duopolistic market structure in the second stage. We, however,
have concerned ourselves with the social welfare implications rather than revenue maximization.
We ﬁrst consider ﬁrst price sealed bid auction and then a second price sealed bid as well as an
all-pay auctions of a single license for a cost reducing production technique in the ﬁrst stage2.
This paper analyzes a situation involving two ﬁrms in the second stage (who are bidding for
the technological innovation in the ﬁrst stage auction), ﬁrst under a Cournot, and then under a
2Other auction formats e.g. All Pay Auction, Second Price Sealed Bid Auction etc, will not, however, change
the parametric conditions of the results substantially.
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Bertrand competition. For both the competitions we study and compare the levels of social welfare
under diﬀerent bid revelation policies. So this paper focuses on three key questions:
1. Generally it is observed that the bids are revealed after the auctions. We here try to see
whether under any circumstances the suppression of the bids can be regarded optimal when
the objective of the government is social welfare maximization.
2. We also try to check whether the optimality of suppression or revelation of bids is anyhow
dependent on the types of the bidding ﬁrms and if so, how.
3. We ﬁnally try to ﬁgure out whether the type of competition prevailing in the market in the
second stage has any impact on the choice of the bid disclosure policy.
We are, however, not considering how the government knows before the auction whether to reveal
or suppress the bids. Therefore, the questions we are addressing in this paper are concerned
with the strategic aspect of the problem3. The paper is organized as follows: section 2 speciﬁes
the structure of the model, section 3 and section 4 elaborate the cases of Cournot and Bertrand
competitions respectively, and ﬁnally section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model: Structure
In this section we specify the structure of the model about the two-stage game, where an auction
takes place in the ﬁrst stage followed by a oligopolistic competition in the second stage.
There are two ﬁrms in the second stage oligopolistic industry. These ﬁrms are also the bidders in
the ﬁrst stage auction. The relative value of the innovation in each ﬁrm's technology is assumed to
be private information to that ﬁrm in our paper. We parametrize this private information for ﬁrm
i by the random variable θˆi such that θˆi ∈ [θ, θ] with 0 < θ < θ. Thus θˆi constitutes type of ﬁrm i
here, where i = 1, 2. θˆi is assumed to be distributed according to the continuously diﬀerentiable
distribution function F (.) with the corresponding density function f(.) having full support. The
distribution of each ﬁrm's private information is thus assumed to be symmetric. Furthermore, we
assume that θˆW and θˆL (where W and L stand for the winning and the losing ﬁrms respectively)
are independent random variables. F (.), θ and θ are assumed to be common knowledge among the
ﬁrms. The realization of the random variable θˆi, denoted by θi is therefore private information to
ﬁrm i.
3It would be an interesting exercise to design a mechanism such that the government can optimally decide
whether to reveal or suppress the bids after the ﬁrst stage auction ex ante, which constitutes a separate research
question that we are not addressing here.
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Now consider the duopolistic industry with a downward sloping linear inverse demand function
P = a − bQ, where P is the price, Q is the aggregate output and a, b > 0. The two ﬁrms are
playing either a Cournot or a Bertrand game in the industry4. The cost function of the ﬁrms are
identical and equal to cqi ∀i = W,L, where qi is output produced by the ith ﬁrm and c > 0 and
constant, when no cost reducing production technique is available. On the other hand, when such
a technique is available, the marginal costs are given by
ci =
c− θi if i wins the auctionc if i loses the auction
where θ < θ < c < c + θ < a5. The objective of both the ﬁrms is to maximize her own expected
proﬁt.
We assume that the government is selling the cost reducing production technique by conducting a
ﬁrst price sealed bid auction. The objective of the government is to maximize the social welfare,
where social welfare is deﬁned as the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus, government
surplus6. The government announces the bid disclosure policy before the auction takes place, so
that while participating in the auction the ﬁrms already know whether the bids after the auction
will be announced or not. In the whole analysis we are only interested in symmetric and increasing
equilibrium bidding strategies in the auction.
Finally, we assume ∀θW dq
∗
W
dθW
> 0 with qW being the output of ﬁrm W and θW being her type
7.
3 Case of Cournot Competition
3.1 Industry with undisclosed bids
Here we consider the case where the government will not disclose any bids. So, before the auction
ﬁrms know that after the auction government will not announce any bids. We will begin our
4We are implicitly assuming that the type of the competition in the market will not change after the auction.
5The last inequality ensures that the innovation is not so drastic as to make the winning bidder the sole producer
in the market.
6Government surplus is the amount of revenue that the government receives after the auction. Because we are
considering ﬁrst price sealed bid auction, the government surplus is nothing but the bid of the winning bidder.
7To motivate this assumption, note that higher type means lower marginal cost if the ﬁrm wins the auction.
This assumption implies that in such a situation the ﬁrm should produce higher output in equilibrium in case of
undisclosed bids. Note that in case of fully disclosed bids
dq∗W
dc < 0 holds always. So, in case of fully disclosed bids
this assumption holds. Also reduction in marginal cost implies that the ﬁrm becomes more eﬃcient if she wins the
auction, so from that point of view also it is (generally) better for the ﬁrm to exploit the eﬃciency and produce
more.
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analysis from stage 2. Let us assume that in stage 1 both the ﬁrms bid according to their true
types. Since the bids are not disclosed, the only information that the winning bidder W possesses
about the losing bidder L is that the bid submitted by L is lower than that submitted by W .
Now, since we are concerned about the symmetric equilibrium where each bidder bids truthfully,
such that the bids are increasing functions of the types, therefore inverting the bids the types
of the bidders can be calculated. Thus the lower bid would certainly imply a lower type. So,
after the auction the winning ﬁrm knows that θL ∈ [θ, θW ]. Similarly, the losing ﬁrm knows that
θW ∈
[
θL, θ
]
.
3.1.1 Characteristics of the equilibrium outputs and proﬁts of the two ﬁrms
In stage 2 the objective of all the ﬁrms is to maximize her own expected proﬁt by choosing an
output level where the demand function of the industry is given in the equation a − b(qW + qL)
with qW being the output of ﬁrm W . Assuming that both the ﬁrms bid truthfully in the ﬁrst stage
auction8, the expected proﬁt function of the winning ﬁrm is given below
ΠW =
θW∫
θ
{[a− c+ θW ] qW − b (qW + qL (θL)) qW} dF (θL |θL < θW )
= [a− c+ θW ] qW − bq2W − bqWF (θW )
θW∫
θ
qL (θL) dF (θL)
Similarly the expected proﬁt of the losing ﬁrm is given below
ΠL =
θ∫
θL
{[a− c] qL − b (qW (θW ) + qL) qL} dF (θW |θW > θL )
= [a− c] qL − bq2L − bqL(1−F (θL))
θ∫
θL
qW (θW ) dF (θW )
Our objective is to prove that bidding truthfully in the ﬁrst stage and producing output according
to true types in the second stage, constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for our concerned
two-stage game.
From the ﬁrst order conditions for expected proﬁt maximization we get the reaction functions for
the winning and losing ﬁrms respectively, which are given below
2qW +
1
F (θW )
θW∫
θ
qL (θL) dF (θL) =
a− c+ θW
b
(3.1)
8Later we show that bidding truthfully is indeed an equilibrium
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and
1
(1− F (θL))
θ∫
θL
qW (θW ) dF (θW ) + 2qL =
a− c
b
(3.2)
We denote the set of equilibrium outputs by q∗W and q
∗
L. Also note that the expression
1
F (θW )
θW∫
θ
qL (θL) dF (θL)
gives us the expected output of the losing ﬁrm from the winning ﬁrm's perspective and simi-
larly 1
(1−F (θL))
θ∫
θL
qW (θW ) dF (θW ) gives us the expected output of the winning ﬁrm from the losing
ﬁrm's perspective. We deﬁne the sum of these two terms, given by 1
F (θW )
θW∫
θ
qL (θL) dF (θL) +
1
(1−F (θL))
θ∫
θL
qW (θW ) dF (θW ), as the Total Expected Output of the Industry (TEOI). Now we are
in a position to state our ﬁrst theorem, which gives some relationships between
dq∗W
dθW
and
dq∗L
dθL
.
Lemma 3.1. (i) For all values of the winning type θW , the equilibrium output level of the winning
ﬁrm q∗W is an increasing function of θW , if and only if for all values of the losing type θL, the
equilibrium output level of the losing ﬁrm, q∗L is a decreasing function of θL, which means that
∀θW dq
∗
W
dθW
> 0 iff ∀θL dq
∗
L
dθL
< 0 (3.3)
(ii) For all values of the winning type θW , if the equilibrium output level of the winning ﬁrm q
∗
W is
a decreasing function of θW , then the equilibrium output level of the losing ﬁrm, q
∗
L is an increasing
function of θL, which means that
if ∀θW dq
∗
W
dθW
< 0 then ∀θL dq
∗
L
dθL
> 0 (3.4)
Proof. See Appendix A
Once the equilibrium outputs are characterized by the above theorem, it is easy to characterize
the expected proﬁt functions of the ﬁrms. The next theorem exactly does this.
Theorem 3.2. if ∀θW dq
∗
W
dθW
> 0 then ∀θW dΠ
∗
W
dθW
> 0 and ∀θL dΠ
∗
L
dθL
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix B
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Before we move on to characterize the social welfare, we ﬁrst show that given the lemma and
theorem stated above, there exists an increasing and symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy for
each of the ﬁrms in the auction.
3.1.2 Characteristics of the equilibrium bidding strategies of two ﬁrms
First we want to emphasize that we are interested in a symmetric and increasing equilibrium
only. This ensures ex-post eﬃciency (i.e. the ﬁrm whose type is the highest gets the innovation).
Consider ﬁrm i. The actual type for ﬁrm i is θi. But suppose ﬁrm i bids according to zi. Let the
symmetric bidding function be denoted by h(.). For the time being assume that h/(.) > 0. The
expected proﬁt of ﬁrm i is given below
[ΠWi (θi)− h (zi)]F (zi) + ΠLi (θi) (1− F (zi))
where ΠWi(.) is the proﬁt of the ﬁrm in stage 2 if she wins the auction in stage 1 and ΠLi(.) is the
proﬁt of the ﬁrm in stage 2 if she loses the auction in stage 1.
Theorem 3.3. If ∀i and ∀θi dq
∗
Wi
dθi
> 0, where q∗Wi is the output produced by ﬁrm i in the industry
and if ﬁrm i wins this auction, then there exists a symmetric and increasing equilibrium in the
above auction, given that in the second stage the ﬁrm i formulates its expectation regarding its
contender's type based on its true type.
Proof. See Appendix C
Finally, we are going to show that in both the stages, both the ﬁrms bidding and producing
according to their true types constitutes a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this two stage
game.
Theorem 3.4. In the ﬁrst stage all the ﬁrms bidding according to their true types and in the
second stage producing according to their true types, is a Perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We have shown in the above Proposition 3.3 that if all the ﬁrms are producing according to
their true types in the second stage, then in the ﬁrst stage auction they will also bid according to
their true types. Similarly, we have also shown that if in the ﬁrst stage they are bidding according
to their true types, then it is optimal for them to produce according to their true types in the
second stage. Therefore, bidding in the ﬁrst stage auction and producing the output in the second
stage, both based on their true types, are sequentially rational. Hence the theorem.
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3.2 Industry with fully revealed bids
Here we consider the case where government will announce all the bids after the auction takes
place. So, before the auction ﬁrms know that after the auction government will announce all the
bids. We will again begin our analysis from stage 2 when after the auction we assume that ﬁrm
1 wins the auction and gets the cost reducing production technique. Assume in stage 1 both the
ﬁrms bid according to their true types. So after the auction the winning ﬁrm knows the actual
value of θL. Similarly, the losing ﬁrm knows the actual value of θW . Since the marginal costs
before the auction are common knowledge to the ﬁrms, so in this case after the auction, both the
ﬁrms can calculate the marginal cost of the rival ﬁrm.
3.2.1 Equilibrium Outputs and Proﬁts
We assume that in stage 2 the objective of each ﬁrm is to maximize her own proﬁt by choosing
an output level. The proﬁt function of the winning ﬁrm is given by ΠW = [a− c+ θW ] qW −
b (qW + qL) qW . Similarly the proﬁt function of the losing ﬁrm is given by ΠL = [a− c] qL −
b (qW + qL) qL.
Reaction functions of the ﬁrms are given by
2q∗W + q
∗
L =
a−c+θW
b
q∗W + 2q
∗
L =
a−c
b
(3.5)
From the equation 3.5, we get q∗W =
a−c+2θW
3b
and q∗L =
a−c−θW
3b
. Also note that Π∗W = bq
∗2
W =
(a−c+2θW )2
9b
and Π∗L = bq
∗2
L =
(a−c−θW )2
9b
9.
3.2.2 Equilibrium Bidding Strategies
Again we are interested in symmetric and increasing equilibrium only. Consider ﬁrm i. The actual
θ for ﬁrm i is θi. But let ﬁrm i bid according to zi (i.e. ﬁrm i signals its type to be zi instead
of θi). Let the symmetric bidding function be denoted by h(.). For the time being assume that
h/(.) > 0. The expected proﬁt of ﬁrm i is given below
[
(a− c+ 2θi)2
9b
− h (zi)
]
F (zi) +
 θ∫
zi
(a− c− θj)2
9b
dF (θj)
 (1− F (zi))
9Note that here ∀θW dΠ
∗
W
dθW
> 0 holds.
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From the ﬁrst order condition of the expected proﬁt maximization we get
h (θi) =
1
F (θi)
θi∫
θ
[
(a− c+ 2zi)2
9b
−
∫ θ
zi
(a− c− θj)2
9b
dF (θj)− (a− c− zi)
2 (1− F (zi))
9b
]
dF (zi)
From the above expression of h(.), one can routinely check that h/ (.) > 0 and the second order
condition for the expected payoﬀ maximization holds.
Now we are in a position to compare the social welfare between fully disclosed and undisclosed bid
regimes. After the comparison we will provide two examples to illustrate the results.
3.3 Comparison of social welfare for limited information and full infor-
mation
Theorem 3.5. If ∀i and ∀θi dq
∗
Wi
dθi
> 0 then industry output under undisclosed bids (QL = q
L∗
W +q
L∗
L )
and industry output under fully disclosed bids (QF = q
F∗
W + q
F∗
L ) have the following relationship
QF T QL iff
2 (a− c) + θW
3b
S TOEI
Proof. See Appendix D
The above theorem basically suggests that the ranking between the total industry output under
fully disclosed bids, QF and QLdepends on the value of TEOI. If the value of TEOI exceeds a
certain threshold value10 then the case with fully disclosed bids yields a higher industry output
than the case under undisclosed bids. This result is quite intuitive because if TOEI is very high
then both the ﬁrms are expecting that her rival ﬁrm will be going to produce a high output so
that it is optimal for her to produce a relatively low output than the case of fully revealed bids
where she knows for certain how much her rival is going to produce.
The condition holds true for the ranking of consumer surpluses under fully disclosed and undisclosed
bids regimes which is formally stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.6. If ∀i and ∀θi dq
∗
Wi
dθi
> 0 then consumer surplus under undisclosed bids (CSL) and
industry output under fully disclosed bids (CSF ) have the following relationship
10Surprisingly this threshold value turns out to be equal to the industry output under fully disclosed bids.
11
CSF T CSL iff 2 (a− c) + θW
3b
S TOEI
Proof. See Appendix E
The net proﬁt of the winning ﬁrm is its proﬁt earned in the industry (in the second stage) net of
its payment as its bid in the auction, whereas the net proﬁt of the losing ﬁrm is simply its proﬁt
earned in the industry. The proﬁt (surplus) of the government (GS) is the revenue earned from
the auction (which is the winning bid). Total Producer Surplus (PS) is the sum of the net proﬁts
of both the ﬁrms.
Note that,ΠFW > Π
F
L , Π
L
W > Π
L
L, Π
F
W > Π
F
L → qFW > qFL and ΠLW > ΠLL → qLW > qLL . Here, ΠFw and
ΠLW denote the proﬁts of the winning ﬁrm under fully disclosed and undisclosed bids respectively,
qFW and q
L
W denote the output of the winning ﬁrm under fully disclosed and undisclosed bids
respectively, ΠFL and Π
L
L denote the proﬁt of the losing ﬁrm under fully disclosed and undisclosed
bids respectively, and qFL and q
L
L denote the output of the losing ﬁrm under fully disclosed and
undisclosed bids respectively. So the following four cases are possible.
Case 1: qFW > q
L
W and q
F
L > q
L
L (here industry output under fully disclosed bids is greater than indus-
try output under undisclosed bids). This case happens when 2(a−c)+θW
6b
< 1
F (θW )
θW∫
θ
q∗L (θL) dF (θL)+
1
(1−F (θL))
θ∫
θL
q∗W (θW ) dF (θW )
Case 2: qFW > q
L
W and q
F
L < q
L
L (here the relation between industry output under fully disclosed
bids and industry output under undisclosed bids is ambiguous)
Case 3: qFW < q
L
W and q
F
L > q
L
L (here the relation between industry output under fully disclosed
bids and industry output under undisclosed bids is ambiguous)
Case 4: qFW < q
L
W and q
F
L < q
L
L (here industry output under fully disclosed bids is less than industry
output under undisclosed bids). This case happens when 2(a−c)+θW
6b
> 1
F (θW )
θW∫
θ
q∗L (θL) dF (θL) +
1
(1−F (θL))
θ∫
θL
q∗W (θW ) dF (θW )
Let us deﬁne the gross proﬁt of a ﬁrm by the proﬁt earned by the ﬁrm in the industry. So, the
gross proﬁt of the winning ﬁrm is the sum of the net proﬁt and the payment of its bid to the
government, whereas the gross proﬁt of the losing ﬁrm is simply its net proﬁt. Let GP be the
gross proﬁt of the industry. So, GP = GPW + GPL = NPW + NPL + GS = PS + GS. Now,
GP F = b
(
qFW
)2
+ b
(
qFL
)2
and GPL = b
(
qLW
)2
+ b
(
qLL
)2
, where GP denotes gross proﬁt, GPW
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denotes the gross proﬁt for the winning ﬁrm, GPL denotes the the gross proﬁt for the losing ﬁrm,
NPW denotes the net proﬁt for the winning ﬁrm, NPL denotes the net proﬁt for the losing ﬁrm,
GS denotes the government's surplus, PS denotes the producer surplus, GP F denotes the gross
proﬁt of the industry under fully disclosed bids, GPL denotes the gross proﬁt of the industry under
undisclosed bids. Let us deﬁne ∆GP = GP F −GPL = b
[(
qFW
)2
+
(
qFL
)2 − (qLW )2 − (qLL)2] as the
diﬀerence between the gross proﬁt under fully disclosed bids and that under undisclosed bids. The
following theorem characterizes ∆GP for the above three cases.
Theorem 3.7. If ∀i and ∀θi dq
∗
Wi
dθi
> 0 then for Case 1 we have ∆GP > 0, and for Case 2 and Case
3 the sign of ∆GP is ambiguous i.e. we have ∆GP R 0 and ﬁnally for case 4 we have ∆GP < 0.
Proof. See Appendix F
The next theorem shows that gross proﬁt under fully disclosed bids (i.e. full information) is an
increasing function of the winning type.
Theorem 3.8. GP is a strictly increasing function of the winning type under fully disclosed bids,
and doesn't depend on the losing type.
Proof. Trivial.
The next theorem in this section compares the levels of social welfare (SW ) under the two diﬀerent
information structures. Let us deﬁne 4SW = SW F −SWL and 4CS = CSF −CSL, where SW F
and SWL are the social welfare levels under fully disclosed and undisclosed bids respectively.
Theorem 3.9. If ∀i and ∀θi dq
∗
Wi
dθi
> 0 then for Case 1 we have ∆SW > 0, and for Case 2 and
Case 3 we have ∆SW T 0 and ﬁnally for Case 4 ∆SW < 0.
Proof. Note that SW = CS + GP , therefore ∆SW = ∆CS + ∆GP . The rest of the proof is
trivial.
The above theorem implies that depending on the types of the ﬁrms it is optimal for the government
to disclose any information (in our case it is the bid of the winning ﬁrm). Also note that in our
case it is the diﬀerence between the industry outputs under diﬀerent information structures that
determines the diﬀerences of social welfare levels under diﬀerent industrial structures. So our ﬁnal
theorem for this section illustrates the condition which decides the diﬀerences in levels of social
welfare under diﬀerent industrial structures.
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Theorem 3.10. If ∀i and ∀θi dq
∗
Wi
dθi
> 0 then
∆SW T 0 iff 2 (a− c) + θW
3b
S TEOI
Proof. Trivial
First, TEOI plays a crucial role to determine whether government should reveal the bids of the
ﬁrms. Second, the same condition guiding the theorems, 3.5 and 3.6 is also impacting the ranking
of the levels social welfare under the two diﬀerent bid disclosure regimes. We illustrate the above
discussed cases with the following example.
Example 3.11. We suppose that q∗i = αi + βiθi where i = W, L (where W stands for winner
and L for loser) and also that θis are uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1]. Here our
objective is to illustrate an equilibrium under undisclosed bids. For simplicity we are interested
in an equilibrium for which the quantity produced by each ﬁrm is a linear function of its type11.
So the proﬁt function under undisclosed bids for the winning bidder can be written as ΠW =
(a− c+ θW ) qW − bq2W − bqW
(
αL +
1
2
βLθW
)
. Therefore, q∗W =
a−c+θW
2b
− 1
2
(
αL +
1
2
βLθW
)
. From
this we can easily verify that
dq∗W
dθW
= 1
2b
− 1
4
βL.
Similarly, for the losing bidder, the proﬁt function can be written as ΠL = (a− c) qL − bq2L −
bqL
[
αW +
1
2
βW (1 + θL)
]
. Therefore, q∗L =
a−c
2b
− 1
2
[
αW +
1
2
βW (1 + θL)
]
. From this we can easily
verify that
dq∗L
dθL
= −1
4
βW .
Again, from our assumptions for this speciﬁc example, we have
dq∗W
dθW
= βW and
dq∗L
dθL
= βL. From
these two sets of relations we can surely infer that ∀βL < 0 iff ∀βW > 0. So this conﬁrms the
results in Theorem 3.1. Now since
dΠ∗W
dθW
= 2bq∗W
dq∗W
dθW
and
dΠ∗L
dθL
= 2bq∗L
dq∗L
dθL
, therefore, the results in
Theorem 3.2 are also conﬁrmed.
From the reaction functions for undisclosed bids (equations 3.1 and 3.2) we can clearly see that
qW (θi) and qL (θi) are not explicitly solvable, since the lack of knowledge about the functional
forms of qW (θi) and qL (θi) makes it impossible for us to integrate them. For our case with
assumptions of linear functions (we assume qL (θL) = αL + βLθL and qW (θW ) = αW + βW θW ), we
get 2αW + αL =
a−c
b
− (2βW + βL2 − 1b) θW and αW + 2αL = a−cb − βW2 − (βW2 + 2βL) θL.
Now, by assumption, αW and αL are independent of θW and θL. Therefore we must have, 2βW +
βL
2
− 1
b
= 0 and βW
2
+ 2βL = 0. Solving these two equations we obtain, βW =
8
15b
and βL = − 215b .
Thus we also obtain αW =
1
45b
[15 (a− c) + 4] and αL = 145b [15 (a− c)− 8].
11Note that our original analysis does not require this simpliﬁed assumption. We are assume linearity here ﬁrst
of all only to illustrate our main results, and secondly to show that their at least exists an equilibrium possibly in
linear form.
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Therefore we get our intended equilibrium quantities for the winning and the losing ﬁrms respec-
tively as qLW (θW ) =
15(a−c)+4+24θW
45b
and qLL (θL) =
15(a−c)−8−6θL
45b
.
The next example shows that depending on θW and θL, we may have any one of the above mentioned
cases.
Example 3.12. We know that qFW =
a−c+2θW
3b
= a−c
3b
+ 2
3b
θW , q
F
L =
a−c−θW
3b
= a−c
3b
− 1
3b
θW ,
qLW (θW ) =
(
a−c
3b
+ 4
45b
)
+ 8
15b
θW and q
L
L (θL) =
(
a−c
3b
− 8
45b
)− 2
15b
θL.
Note that qFW (θW ) T qLW (θW ) iff θW T 23 , qFL (θW ) T qLL (θL) iff θL S
(−4
3
+ 5
2
θW
)
and qLW (θW )+
qLL (θL) =
2(a−c)
3b
+ 8
15b
θW − 215bθL − 445b , therefore,
2(a−c)+θW
3b
S
[
1
F (θW )
∫ θW
θ
q∗L (θL) dF (θL) +
1
(1−F (θL))
∫ θ
θL
q∗W (θW ) dF (θW )
]
⇔ 2
13
θL +
4
39
T θW
First, note that if θW 5 439 , then it is better for the government to suppress the information before
the auction. Again if θW >
2
13
θL +
4
39
, then it is better to disclose the information before the
auction. Finally in case of 2
13
θL +
4
39
= θW , the government is indiﬀerent between suppressing or
disclosing the information.
Remark 3.13. In case of Second Price Sealed Bid Auction the expected proﬁt function for the
winning ﬁrm is given by ΠW = (a− c+ θW ) qW − b (qW + qL (θL)) qW and that for the losing ﬁrm
is ΠL =
θ∫
θL
[(a− c) qL − b (qW (θW ; θL) + qL) qL] dF (θW |θW > θL). From these two equations we can
ﬁnd the reaction functions as 2qW + qL (θL) =
a−c+θW
b
and 2qL +
1
1−F (θL)
θ∫
θL
qW (θW ; θL) dF (θW ) =
a−c
b
. Proceeding analogously as the previous analysis it can be shown that
∆SW T 0 iff 2 (a− c) + θW
3b
S
[
q∗L (θL) +
1
(1− F (θL))
∫ θ
θL
q∗W (θW ; θL) dF (θW )
]
The equilibrium bidding strategy in the ﬁrst stage for undisclosed bids is given by h (θi) =
ΠiW (θi; θi)−ΠiL (θi) and that for fully disclosed bids is given by h (θi) = (a−c+2θi)
2
9b
−
θ∫
θi
(a−c−θj)2
9b
dF (θj)−
(1− F (θi)) f (θi) (a−c−θi)
2
9b
.
Remark 3.14. For an all-pay auction, the analysis of the second stage game will be the same as
that for the ﬁrst price sealed-bid auction. Only the bidding strategies will be diﬀerent. h (θi) =
θi∫
θ
[
(a−c+2zi)2
9b
−
θ∫
zi
(a−c−θj)2
9b
dF (θj)− (a−c−zi)
2
9b
(1− F (zi))
]
dF (zi) is the equilibrium bidding strat-
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egy in the ﬁrst stage for fully disclosed bids and that for undisclosed bids is given by h (θi) =
θi∫
θ
[ΠWi (zi)− ΠLi (zi)] dF (zi).
4 Case of Bertrand Competition
4.1 Bidding Strategies
Blume (2003) has analyzed Bertrand competition with homogeneous products and diﬀerent marginal
costs and has established an equilibrium in undominated strategies. In such an equilibrium, the
conventional outcome in which the low-cost ﬁrm charges a price equal to the high-cost ﬁrm's
cost is supported by an equilibrium under standard rationing rule that both ﬁrms split the market
if their prices coincide. Moreover, any equilibrium that supports this outcome has the appealing
property that it does not rely on the use of dominated strategies. Here, it seems a good idea to
elaborate a little bit on Blume's analysis.
Blume (2003) considers two ﬁrms with commonly known marginal costs c1 and c2 respectively,
where c1 < c2. Both the ﬁrms produce identical products and face a strictly decreasing and
diﬀerentiable market demand function D (p) on [0, p] with c2 < p ≤ ∞. The price that the low-
cost ﬁrm would charge, in case it were a monopolist, pm (c1) , satisﬁes c2 < p
m (c1). Blume (2003)
claims that, for small enough η > 0, the low-cost ﬁrm charging a price c2and the high-cost ﬁrm
randomizing uniformly over [c2, c2 + η], constitutes an equilibrium.
Thus, from the analysis presented by Blume (2003), we can straightaway ﬁnd out the prevailing
price and thus quantity levels for the second stage of our concerned game. Very evidently the
price in the second stage will be P = c which is the cost of both the ﬁrms before the sale of the
cost-reducing technological innovation and thus it remains the cost of the losing ﬁrm in the ﬁrst
stage auction (as a consequence the losing ﬁrm becomes the high-cost ﬁrm). The winning ﬁrm in
the ﬁrst stage experiences a positive proﬁt in the second stage since its cost in the second stage
is (c− θW ) and it charges a price c. Here the disclosure of the bids plays no role since the very
information that the losing ﬁrm's marginal cost is higher than that of the winning ﬁrm is suﬃcient
to ensure an outcome where the winning and therefore the low-cost ﬁrm charges a price P = c
. The knowledge of the losing ﬁrm's type does not have any impact on the price decision of the
winning ﬁrm. Therefore, the outcome will be the same irrespective of the bid being disclosed after
the auction in the ﬁrst stage. The proﬁt earned by the winning ﬁrm in the second stage is
ΠW = θW q (c)
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The losing ﬁrm, however, always earns a zero proﬁt in the second stage. Therefore, the expected
payoﬀ in the ﬁrst stage for a ﬁrst price sealed-bid auction for any ﬁrm i , when it submits a bid
b (zi), pretending to have a type zi when its true type is θi , can be written as
E [Πi] = F (zi) (θiq (c)− b (zi))
From the ﬁrst order condition for maximization of this expected payoﬀ function, we obtain
∂E[Πi]
∂zi
= 0
⇒ θiq (c) f (zi)− [b (zi)F (zi)]/ = 0
At a symmetric equilibrium zi = θi , so that we can write the above equation as
θiq (c) f (θi)− [b (θi)F (θi)]/ = 0
⇒ b (θi) = q (c)
[
θi − 1F (θi)
θi∫
θ
F (y) dy
]
To check ﬁrst whether b (θi) is indeed increasing in θi , we diﬀerentiate both sides of the above
equation with respect to θi , and thus obtain b
/ (θi) > 0. To check for a maximum, we proceed
to check the second order condition as ∂
2E[Πi]
∂z2i
|zi=θi = −q (c) f (θi) < 0 . Thus the second order
condition is also satisﬁed. Therefore, b (θi) indeed constitutes an equilibrium for this ﬁrst price
sealed-bid auction.
4.2 Level of Social Welfare
Here the level of social welfare is simply the sum of the consumer surplus and the producer surplus
since the payment of the winning ﬁrm is equal to the revenue earned by the government. So in the
calculation of the total social surplus, these payments and revenue terms will cancel each other out.
The total social welfare will therefore be equal to the sum of consumer surplus (CS) and producer
surplus (PS) in all the three types of auctions12. In each case CS and PS are the same since the
price, and therefore quantity, are decided independent of the information regarding type or the
payment rule in the ﬁrst stage auction. We can easily verify that CS = 1
2
(a−c)2
b
and PS = (a−c)
b
θW .
Thus the total social welfare would be SW = CS + PS = (a−c)(a−c+2θW )
2b
. It is evident from the
above analysis, that the level of social welfare under the Bertrand type of competition in the second
stage is independent of the bid disclosure policy and the type of auction.
12We have considered the same market demand function as that in Cournot.
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Remark 4.1. In case of Second Price Sealed Bid Auction, the expected payoﬀ function can be
written as E [Πi] = F (zi) (θiq (c)− E (b (θj) |θj < zi)) = F (zi) θiq (c)−
zi∫
θ
b (θj) f (θj) dθj. Following
the routine procedure we can calculate the corresponding bidding strategy in a truthful equilibrium
as b (θi) = θiq (c).
E [Πi] = F (zi) θiq (c)− b (zi) is the expected payoﬀ functions of the ﬁrms for the all-pay auction.
Again we can show that the bidding strategy in this case is given by b (θi) = q (c)
θi∫
θ
yf (y) dy.
For both the types of auctions the levels of social welfare remain unaﬀected by the bid disclosure
policy.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed a two-stage game where in the ﬁrst stage a cost-reducing production
technique is sold through a ﬁrst-price sealed bid auction. We have considered only two bidders
for the present analysis who are competitors in an oligopolistic market in the second stage. Since
there is only one unit of the cost-reducing production technique, therefore only one ﬁrm can make
use of it in the second stage. Before the adoption of this cost reducing production technique,
the cost structures of the ﬁrms have been assumed to be identical and common knowledge. The
cost reduction resulting from the adoption of this production technique has been assumed to be
diﬀerent for the ﬁrms and a private information for each ﬁrm. Thus the amount of cost reduction
constitutes the type of each ﬁrm in our analysis. The types of the ﬁrms have been assumed to be
distributed over the same interval following the same distribution function and both of these have
been assumed to be common knowledge. Based on this type, each ﬁrm submits a bid in the ﬁrst
period auction.
For the second stage, where the ﬁrms compete in an oligopolistic market, we have considered
two alternative market structures, one is a Cournot competition and the other one is a Bertrand
competition. Depending on these two alternative structures the bid functions in a symmetric
equilibrium in the ﬁrst stage auction have been calculated. We have assumed the auctioneer to
be a social welfare maximizing agent whom we have termed as the government. The government
chooses to announce or not to announce the bids after the ﬁrst stage when the auction gets over
and before the competition in the second stage starts. Whether the bids would be disclosed or
suppressed after the ﬁrst stage auction is announced before the auction itself. Depending on
whether the information regarding bids is revealed, the output levels of the ﬁrms in a Cournot
type of competitive market vary. We have compared the total social welfare levels for both these
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cases under a Cournot competition and have calculated the outcomes under diﬀerent parametric
restrictions. Our results suggest that the industry output, consumer surplus and the level of social
welfare in a Cournot type of industry is higher when the government chooses to announce the
bids after the ﬁrst stage auction, provided the total expected output of the industry under the
undisclosed bid regime is lower than the total industry output in the Cournot competition with
fully disclosed bids. We have also provided illustrative examples for all the above mentioned cases.
Finally, we have shown that the prevailing price will always remain equal to the marginal cost
of the ﬁrms before the adoption of the cost-reducing production technique even though only two
ﬁrms are competing in a Bertrand type of competition. Therefore the bid revelation policy will
have no impact on the level of social welfare when the the second stage oligopolistic competition
is of a Bertrand type.
These results have signiﬁcant policy implications. First, they show that it is not always optimum
for the government to reveal the bids as most of the governments do after the auction in reality.
Second, as the choice of the government does not have any impact on the social welfare under
Bertrand competition, government now decides whether to reveal the bids or not by looking at
the after-market type. Finally, since the paper fully characterizes the parametric conditions of bid
revelation, one only needs to ﬁnd a mechanism that reveals these parametric conditions before the
auction takes place.
An interesting extension of this analysis will be to study the case of Cournot competition involving
more than two ﬁrms when the bids are not disclosed after the ﬁrst stage auction. Another inter-
esting exercise would be to design a mechanism such that the government can optimally decide
whether to reveal or suppress the bids after the ﬁrst stage auction ex ante. Both of these questions
can be taken up for future research.
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Appendix
A Proof of the Theorem 3.1
First, diﬀerentiating equation 3.1 with respect to θWwe get
2
dq∗W
dθW
− f(θW )
F 2(θW )
∫ θW
θ
q∗L (θL) dF (θL) +
1
F (θW )
q∗L (θW ) f (θW ) =
1
b
dq∗W
dθW
= 1
2b
+ f(θW )
2F (θW )
[
1
F (θW )
∫ θW
θ
q∗L (θL) dF (θL)− q∗L (θW )
]
dq∗W
dθW
= 1
2b
+ f(θW )
2F (θW )
[
1
F (θW )
[
q∗L (θW )F (θW )−
∫ θW
θ
q
∗/
L (θL)F (θL) dθL
]
− q∗L (θW )
]
dq∗W
dθW
= 1
2b
− f(θW )
2F (θW )
2
∫ θW
θ
q
∗/
L (θL)F (θL) dθL
So the change in equilibrium output of the winning ﬁrm with respect to θW is given by the equation
below
dq∗W
dθW
=
1
2b
− f (θW )
2F (θW )
2
∫ θW
θ
q
∗/
L (θL)F (θL) dθL (A.1)
Next, diﬀerentiating equation 3.2 with respect to θLwe get
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2
dq∗L
dθL
+ f(θL)
(1−F (θL))2
∫ θ
θL
q∗W (θW ) dF (θW )− 11−F (θL)q∗W (θW ) f (θW ) = 0
dq∗L
dθL
= − f(θL)
2(1−F (θL))
[
1
1−F (θL)
∫ θ
θL
q∗W (θ1) dF (θW )− q∗W (θL)
]
dq∗L
dθL
= − f(θL)
2(1−F (θL))
[
q∗W (θL) +
1
1−F (θL)
[[
q∗W
(
θ
)− q∗W (θL)]− ∫ θθL q∗/W (θW )F (θW ) dθW]− q∗W (θL)]
dq∗L
dθL
= − f(θL)
2(1−F (θL))2
[[
q∗W
(
θ
)− q∗W (θL)]− ∫ θθL q∗/W (θW )F (θW ) dθW]
So the change in equilibrium output of ﬁrm the losing ﬁrm with respect to θL is given by the
equation below
dq∗L
dθL
= − f (θL)
2 (1− F (θL))2
[[
q∗W
(
θ
)− q∗W (θL)]− ∫ θ
θL
q
∗/
W (θW )F (θW ) dθW
]
(A.2)
From the equations A.1 and A.2 the theorem is trivial.
B Proof of the Theorem 3.2
We will prove this theorem by using Theorem 3.1.
Firstly note that from equation 3.1 we get
2qW +
1
F (θW )
∫ θW
θ
qL (θL) dF (θL) =
a−c+θW
b∫ θW
θ
qL (θL) dF (θL) = F (θW )
(
a−c+θW
b
− 2qW
) (B.1)
and from equation 3.2 we get
1
(1−F (θL))
∫ θ
θL
qW (θW ) dF (θW ) + 2qL =
a−c
b∫ θ
θL
qW (θW ) dF (θW ) = (1− F (θL))
(
a−c
b
− 2qL
) (B.2)
Now, substituting equation B.1 in ΠW we get
Π∗W
= [a− c+ θW ] q∗W − bq∗2W − bq
∗
W
F (θW )
∫ θW
θ
q∗W (θW ) dF (θW )
= [a− c+ θW ] q∗W − bq∗2W − bq
∗
W
F (θW )
F (θW )
(
a−c+θW
b
− 2qW
)
= bq∗2W (θW )
(B.3)
Similarly, substituting equation B.2 in ΠL we get
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Π∗L
= [a− c] qL − bq2L − bqL(1−F (θL))
∫ θ
θL
qW (θW ) dF (θW )
= [a− c] qL − bq2L − bqL(1−F (θL)) (1− F (θL))
(
a−c
b
− 2qL
)
= bq∗2L (θL)
(B.4)
Finally, note that
dΠ∗W
dθW
= 2bq∗W (θW )
dq∗W
dθW
(B.5)
and
dΠ∗L
dθL
= 2bq∗L (θL)
dq∗L
dθL
(B.6)
From equations B.5 and B.6 and from Theorem 3.1 we can trivially prove this theorem.
C Proof of the Theorem 3.3
From the ﬁrst order condition of the expected proﬁt maximization we get
ΠWi (θi) f (zi)− h/ (zi)F (zi)− f (zi)h (zi)− ΠLi (θi) f (zi) = 0
[ΠWi (θi)− ΠLi (θi)] f (zi) dzi = d [F (zi)h (zi)]
h (θi) =
1
F (θi)
∫ θi
θ
[ΠWi (zi)− ΠLi (zi)] dF (zi)
h (θi) =
1
F (θi)
[
[ΠWi (θi)− ΠLi (θi)]F (θi)−
∫ θi
θ
[
Π
/
Wi (zi)− Π/Li (zi)
]
F (zi) dzi
]
h (θi) = [ΠWi (θi)− ΠLi (θi)]− 1F (θi)
∫ θi
θ
[
Π
/
Wi (zi)− Π/Li (zi)
]
F (zi) dzi
(C.1)
From the above equation we get
h/ (θi) =
f (θi)
F (θi)
2
∫ θi
θ
[
Π
/
Wi (zi)− Π/Li (zi)
]
F (zi) dzi > 0 (C.2)
The last inequality follows from the assumption ∀i and ∀θi dq
∗
Wi
dθi
> 0. Let us now check the second
order condition of the expected payoﬀ maximization. Suppose the actual type of the bidder i is θi
but she bids according to the type θ˜i. Her expected payoﬀ is given below.
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EΠi
(
θi, θ˜i
)
= F
(
θ˜i
) [
ΠWi (θi)− h
(
θ˜i
)]
+
(
1− F
(
θ˜i
))
ΠLi (θi)
= F
(
θ˜i
)[
ΠWi (θi)−
[[
ΠWi
(
θ˜i
)
− ΠLi
(
θ˜i
)]
− 1
F(θ˜i)
∫ θ˜i
θ
[
Π
/
Wi (zi)− Π/Li (zi)
]
F (zi) dzi
]]
+
(
1− F
(
θ˜i
))
ΠLi (θi)
= ΠLi (θi) + F
(
θ˜i
) [
[ΠWi (θi)− ΠLi (θi)]−
[
ΠWi
(
θ˜i
)
− ΠLi
(
θ˜i
)]]
+
∫ θ˜i
θ
[
Π
/
Wi (zi)− Π/Li (zi)
]
F (zi) dzi
Therefore, EΠi (θi, θi) = ΠLi (θi) +
∫ θi
θ
[
Π
/
Wi (zi)− Π/Li (zi)
]
F (zi) dzi
Our objective is to show that given θi, the expression
[
EΠi (θi, θi)− EΠi
(
θi, θ˜i
)]
has a minimum
at θ˜i = θi, and that minimum value is equal to zero. Note that at θ˜i = θi,
[
EΠi (θi, θi)− EΠi
(
θi, θ˜i
)]
=
0.
Note that
[
EΠi (θi, θi)− EΠi
(
θi, θ˜i
)]
=
∫ θi
θ˜i
[
Π
/
Wi (θj)− Π/Li (θj)
]
F (θj) dθj
−F
(
θ˜i
) [
{ΠWi (θi)− ΠLi (θi)} −
{
ΠWi
(
θ˜i
)
− ΠLi
(
θ˜i
)}] (C.3)
we want to minimize the above equation by choosing θ˜i, given θi.
The ﬁrst order condition of the minimization problem yields
− [ΠWi (θi)− ΠLi (θi)] f
(
θ˜i
)
+
[
ΠWi
(
θ˜i
)
− ΠLi
(
θ˜i
)]
f
(
θ˜i
)
= 0
OR, [ΠWi (θi)− ΠLi (θi)] =
[
ΠWi
(
θ˜i
)
− ΠLi
(
θ˜i
)]
The above equation is satisﬁed at θ˜i = θi. So
[
EΠi (θi, θi)− EΠi
(
θi, θ˜i
)]
is optimized at θ˜i = θi.
To check whether it is minimized or not we proceed to check the second order condition at this
point. The second order condition is given below
− [ΠWi (θi)− ΠLi (θi)] f /
(
θ˜i
)
+
[
ΠWi
(
θ˜i
)
− ΠLi
(
θ˜i
)]
f /
(
θ˜i
)
+
[
Π
/
Wi
(
θ˜i
)
− Π/Li
(
θ˜i
)]
f
(
θ˜i
)
|θ˜i=θi
=
[
Π
/
Wi (θi)− Π/Li (θi)
]
f (θi) > 0
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The last inequality follows from the assumption ∀i and ∀θi dq
∗
Wi
dθi
> 0.
So, from equation C.2, Theorem 3.1 and 3.2, we can prove this theorem.
D Proof of the Theorem 3.5
Note that
2q∗W +
1
F (θW )
∫ θW
θ
q∗L (θL) dF (θL) =
a−c+θW
b
2q∗W =
a−c+θW
b
− 1
F (θW )
∫ θW
θ
q∗L (θL) dF (θL)
and
1
(1−F (θL))
∫ θ
θL
q∗W (θW ) dF (θW ) + 2q
∗
L =
a−c
b
2q∗L =
a−c
b
− 1
(1−F (θL))
∫ θ
θL
q∗W (θW ) dF (θW )
Adding both the equations we get
q∗W + q
∗
L =
2 (a− c) + θW
2b
− 1
2
[
1
F (θW )
∫ θW
θ
q∗L (θL) dF (θL) +
1
(1− F (θL))
∫ θ
θL
q∗W (θW ) dF (θW )
]
Therefore,
QF T QL
⇔ 2(a−c)+θW
3b
− 2(a−c)+θW
2b
+ 1
2
[
1
F (θW )
∫ θW
θ
q∗L (θL) dF (θL) +
1
(1−F (θL))
∫ θ
θL
q∗W (θW ) dF (θW )
]
T 0
⇔ 2(a−c)+θW
6b
S 1
2
[
1
F (θW )
∫ θW
θ
q∗L (θL) dF (θL) +
1
(1−F (θL))
∫ θ
θL
q∗W (θW ) dF (θW )
]
E Proof of the Theorem 3.6
Consumer Surplus (CS) under fully disclosed bids is given by
CSF =
1
2
b
(
qFW + q
F
L
)2
Consumer surplus under undisclosed bids can be written as
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CSL =
1
2
b
(
qLW + q
L
L
)2
The rest of the proof trivially follows from the above theorem (Theorem:3.5).
F Proof of the Theorem 3.7
Note that
∆GP
= b
[(
qFW
)2
+
(
qFL
)2 − (qLW )2 − (qLL)2]
= b
[(
qFW + q
L
W
) (
qFW − qLW
)
+
(
qFL + q
L
L
) (
qFL − qLL
)]
Case 1: (qFW > q
L
W and q
F
L > q
L
L) The proof is trivial.
Case 2: (qFW > q
L
W and q
F
L < q
L
L)
∆GP
= b
[(
qFW + q
L
W
) (
qFW − qLW
)
+
(
qFL + q
L
L
) (
qFL − qLL
)]
T 0
Since
(
qFW + q
L
W
)
T
(
qFL + q
L
L
)
and note that
(
qFW + q
F
L
)
T
(
qLW + q
L
L
)
⇒ (qFW − qLW ) T (qLL − qFL ) > 0
Case 3: (qFW < q
L
W and q
F
L > q
L
L) The proof is similar to the proof of Case 2.
Case 4: (qFW < q
L
W and q
F
L < q
L
L) The proof is trivial.
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